Legal Resources Needs for Alternative Production Enterprises: Issues Raised by Project Experiences in Jamaica by Williams, Allan N.
Third World Legal Studies
Volume 6 The Application of Law and Development
Theory: Some Case Studies Article 3
1-3-1987
Legal Resources Needs for Alternative Production
Enterprises: Issues Raised by Project Experiences in
Jamaica
Allan N. Williams
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholar.valpo.edu/twls
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Valparaiso University Law School at ValpoScholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Third World Legal Studies by an authorized administrator of ValpoScholar. For more information, please contact a ValpoScholar staff member at
scholar@valpo.edu.
Recommended Citation
Williams, Allan N. (1987) "Legal Resources Needs for Alternative Production Enterprises: Issues Raised by Project Experiences in
Jamaica," Third World Legal Studies: Vol. 6, Article 3.
Available at: http://scholar.valpo.edu/twls/vol6/iss1/3
LEGAL RESOURCES NEEDS FOR ALTERNATIVE
PRODUCTION ENTERPRISES: Issues Raised by
Project Experiences in Jamaica*
Dr. Allan N. Williams **
INTRODUCTION
The countries of the Commonwealth Caribbean' reflect some of the
basic contradictions of Third World economies in the 1980s. They are
predominantly agricultural economies, or have a significant proportion of
their population in agricultural activities, yet they are faced with the
problem of adequately feeding themselves. Their agricultural resources are
employed primarily in the production of a few export commodities, e.g.
bananas, sugar, spices, the world market prices of which have been in a
long-term downward trend. At the same time a major proportion of their
fuel, food and capital goods have to be imported with foreign exchange
which is becoming increasingly difficult to earn.
A new factor that is causing some concern is the susceptibility of
Caribbean economies to physical dislocation from major natural disasters,
such as hurricanes, earthquakes, and volcanic activities. Each year, during
the period June to November, over twenty significant tropical storms pass
through this region, each with a potential to develop into a hurricane of
major proportions. Each year some part of the physical infrastructure of
one of the Caribbean islands is destroyed by either the rains from a
tropical depression, or the winds of an hurricane - the most recent of
* This updated article is based on a paper presented at the Eighth Annual Symposium on
Law and Development, "Developing Legal Resources for Alternative Strategies of Development", at
the University of Windsor (Ontario), Faculty of Law, March 24-26, 1983. It is produced here with
the permission of the organizers.
** Dr. Allan N. Williams is the Director of Programmes, Association for Caribbean
Transformation Ltd. Trinidad & Tobago. He has been a consultant on self-managed enterprises and
producer cooperatives in various Caribbean Territories.
1. The countries of the Commonwealth Caribbean comprise the English-speaking territories
of this region that were formerly colonies of the United Kingdom.
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which has been Hurricane Gilbert, which devastated portions of the island
of Jamaica in September 1988.
The concept of alternative production structures as a viable comple-
ment to the macro economic programmes has always had some appeal to
low income groups. In the Caribbean, we have tried various types of
development projects aimed at promoting such enterprises among the rural
poor. These have included farmer settlement schemes, production coop-
eratives, state run farms, community-based businesses, and fully self-
managed enterprises. We conceptually group this amalgamation of efforts
under the umbrella of "alternative production structures." The underlining
assumption in all of these projects has been to organize persons who have
no income-earning assets (besides their labour), into productive enterprises,
without assigning the leading role to the owners of capital.
To date, the initiative to promote such enterprises remains largely
within the realm of the State.' Many examples abound of the State
promoting new enterprise formation from above, supporting organized
self-development efforts coming from below, and also using its powers to
blunt the initiatives of individuals and groups to control and use productive
resources. We have also witnessed the corollary of this approach, which
is efforts by the State to encourage job creation through the more
conventional corporate expansion.
There are many resource needs that can be identified in the process
of promoting alternative production structures in Third World economies.
One of these, which is often poorly defined, to the detriment of the
project, is that of legal resources. Legal resources have been aptly defined
as a functional knowledge of the relevant law and the skills to USE and
DEVELOP law in order to promote and protect shared group interests
and rights. Some of the aspects of alternative production structures are
inconsistent with the established regulations that ensure that capital own-
ership means control of the production process. Consequently, a legal
resources framework becomes essential if non-propertied individuals are
to gain access to, and maintain the right of use of productive assets,
without necessarily having to own them.
The State is the embodiment of the legal arrangements in the society,
and these legal arrangements span both social and economic relations.
The State promulgates laws in its efforts to promote job creation by the
conventional corporate structures. It does likewise, in its efforts to facil-
2. Even revolutionary movements which culminate in the capture of land resources by farmers
and workers are usually quickly brought under the regulations of the State.
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itate alternative production enterprises. In fact, in most cases the major
capital assets are usually owned by the State. Thus, although such enter-
prises are expected to be autonomous of the State, that does not mean
that State intervention should be viewed in a similar way as Thomas
Aquinas did when he analysed taxation under the heading "Utrum Rapina
Possit Fieri Sine Peccato" - whether there could be plundering without
sin! What is required more is action by all parties involved to ensure that
the legal arrangements are consistent with sustaining such enterprises.
WHY JAMAICA IS ILLUSTRATIVE
This paper reflects on some efforts by a previous Jamaican Govern-
ment to promote alternative production structures in an effort to promote
the economic development of the people of that island. These efforts were
undertaken during the period 1972 - 1980, but the experiences still hold
some lessons for us in 1988.
There are some very good reasons to look at Jamaica's experiences
once more. In the period 1970 to 1988, successive Jamaican Governments
faced similar problems but conducted diametrically opposite experiments
to resolve these issues.
In the period 1972 - 1980, the Government of Prime Minister Michael
Manley was faced with, among other problems, a high unemployment
rate and poverty among the rural inhabitants of Jamaica. Under the title
of Democratic Socialism, this Government attempted to support indivi-
duals and groups in the rural communities to gain access to land resources
for the purpose of promoting new productive enterprises. By 1980 it was
quite clear that these efforts and other programmes were a total failure,
as the population resolutely voted the Prime Minister out of office.
The following eight years, 1980 - 1988, the Government of Prime
Minister Edward Seaga, under its ideology of private enterprise capitalism,
sought to resolve the unemployment situation through job creation. The
experiments of the previous regime were allowed to disintegrate, while
emphasis was placed on attracting foreign capital in order to create new
jobs. By mid-1988, opinion polls conducted by Dr. Carl Stone of the
University of the West Indies were indicating that this Government was
as unpopular as was the Manley Government when it was voted out of
office.
So it appears that in these sixteen years, neither approach won. Added
to this, however, is the fact that Hurricane Gilbert seriously dislocated
the productive structure of the economy in September 1988, raising once
more the need to restructure the productive system in the country. Even
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though we do not advocate a simplistic return to the policies of the 1970s,
one still ought to reexamine them for the lessons that they hold.
LESSONS FOR PROJECT PLANNERS
Over the last two decades, the design and implementation of economic
development projects have revealed the pervasiveness of three main con-
cerns. The first concern has been with ECONOMIC GROWTH. Devel-
opment projects have all been expected to make positive contributions to
one of the many indicators of economic growth, viz., gross domestic
output, per capita income, balance of payments.
The second concern has been with ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY. De-
velopment projects are also expected to bring into productive use some
of the portions of the nation's economic resources that are presently
unutilized or under-utilized. The third concern is that development projects
function within the market mechanism for DISTRIBUTION and EX-
CHANGE. This means that the project must become viable within the
market economy and not become a drain on the resources of the State.
These basic principles of development projects were adopted by both
Jamaican Governments, leading one to believe that they were not incon-
sistent with either form of enterprise being promoted. Projects have always
been seen in terms of increasing, in both quantitative and qualitative
terms, the capital stock of the nation, whether expressed in factories,
machinery, skilled labour, or cultivated acreage. However, it is clear that
foreign capital and the need for high rates of return have tended to skew
the preferences away from rural based (agricultural) enterprises. However,
nothing in the experiences of the Jamaican Sugar Producers Cooperatives,
for example, would indicate that such enterprise structures are inconsistent
with the notion of capital formation, even though the horizon may be
much longer.
The question, therefore, is not whether Jamaica should rely on one
type of productive initiative as against another. Of more importance is
the question of whether the legal framework so familiar in the case of
capital-based initiatives is consistent with supporting a productive initiative
by people based solely on their ability to work. People-based initiatives
have certain aspects not found in capital-based initiatives.
The first of these aspects is POPULAR PARTICIPATION. This theme
suggests that individuals in the projects be permitted to exert direct control
over the resources they utilize. From the point of view of promoting
alternative production enterprises, operationalizing this theme means a
less hierarchical enterprise structure, more decentralized decision-making
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mechanisms, and on the national level, effective devolution of economic
power and enterprise autonomy. That would mean that planners are
restricted in their ability to prescribe the use of the assets before inviting
persons to use them.
The second aspect has to do with the broader concept of EQUITY
and SOCIAL JUSTICE. Participation in production, whether as owners
of labour or capital, is a major source of personal wealth. When the
social ethos is for a more equitable distribution of the goods and services
in society, the productive enterprise becomes more than a focal point for
the exchange of resources. Alternative production enterprises must also
be conceived of as effective delivery systems for public goods such as
education, health, transportation, information, etc., as well as an organ-
ized base for the public distribution of essential commodities, especially
in times of natural disasters.
One can easily see some of the ramifications of developing alternative
enterprises with these qualities. We first have to ensure that individuals'
rights of use of productive assets are not abridged by the ownership rights
of someone else. That implies a clear distinction in the production process
between ownership of productive ASSETS and control of the production
PROCESS. Then there is the question of distribution within the enterprise
between individual remunerations and collective consumption. The former
may be based on one's work while the latter may be based on one's social
(family) responsibilities.
The structure of an enterprise is partly prescribed by its laws and
regulations. That is the de jure structure. The de facto structure is the
one that evolves on the basis of accepted practices. The extent to which
project planners, who are promoting alternative production enterprises,
fail either to understand or to address these issues, will determine the
extent to which the de facto structure fails to fulfill the expectations of
all involved.
LESSONS OF PROJECT LAND LEASE
One of the first lessons from Jamaica's experience has to do with
who determines the actual form in which the State's commitment to a
domestic transfer of productive resources is realized.
Project Land Lease was established by the Government of Jamaica in
February 1973. The objective of the project was to lease properties un!
under utilized by their current owners and to sublet them to farmers for
the purpose of producing domestic food crops.3 The Project, therefore,
3. "An Evaluation of Project Land Lease and Project Food Farm."
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acquired parcels of land that the large landowners were willing to lease
to the Government on a short-term (five-year) basis. What happened was
that most of the lands acquired were of marginal worth to their owners,
hence their willingness to lease it.
Table I shows the grading of properties leased by Project Land Lease,
according to the land capability criteria of the Agronomy Division of the
Ministry of Agriculture of Jamaica. Lands with serious limitations of
drainage, erosion, adverse soil conditions or very low rainfall were clas-
sified as "FAIR." In total, about one-third of the lands leased were unfit
to be used, another 4507o could only be used with major investments, and
at most 2207 may have been considered as providing a viable economic
base.
TABLE 1
GRADING OF PROPERTY ACQUIRED UNDER PROJECT LAND LEASE
Category Percentage
Very Good 5.707o
Good 17.0016
Fair 45.307o
Poor 20.707o
Very Poor 11.307o
Source: An Evaluation of Project Land Lease & Project Food Farms,
Agricultural Planning Unit, Ministry of Agriculture, Government of Jamaica, p.
5, (July 1974).
In the first place, the participants in this project lacked the ability to
gain easy access to the decision-makers to ensure that the project trans-
ferred productive land resources. Furthermore, tenant regulations that did
not distinguish qualitatively between different parcels of land, left those
within the fair or poor land category at a serious disadvantage. If the
intention of a project is to support the development of the land resource,
to make it more fertile over time, then it involves a long-term commitment.
It cannot be accommodated under a five-year lease. Indeed, one who
knows that his use of the land is limited to five years would be rational
in not undertaking any serious investment decisions to improve the quality
of the resource, unless of course provisions were made in the agreement
to recompense him at the termination of his tenancy. Thus the instruments
that guarantee the right to use a productive resource must make that right
consistent on a time basis with the task of developing the resource into
a productive asset.
Another issue that arose was whether the State should transfer the
total cost of its land acquisition to the beneficiaries. Now that must be
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distinguished from efforts of the State to recuperate its acquisition costs
through legal economic agreements with the beneficiaries. What happened
in the former case was that the State used its monopoly position to impose
a unilateral tax on participants in Project Land Lease under the pretext
of a land rental. The "rent" charged tenants was actually the per acre
cost to the Government of acquiring (leasing) the land from the owners.
Land rentals should be based on the potential value of the land and
the estimated income stream from its use. There is no free market
mechanism under which the State could have been able to sublet some of
the poor quality land for a positive fee. If the State did not have the
unilateral power of taxation, Project Land Lease administrators would
not have leased some of the poor quality lands. Consequently, we have
learned that alternative production enterprises must ensure that their
resource base is not undermined by the unilateral imposition of adminis-
trative or institutional costs that accompany the domestic transfer of
productive resources.
There is a special feature that distinguishes land resources from labour
and capital. Land may be transferred in ownership through legal instru-
ments but never in physical location. That means that it always remains
within the jurisdiction of the State. This fact provides the State with
ample reasons to participate in the improvement of the productivity of
land resources, even though it does not control its use. In other parts of
the economy, tax incentives, education, transportation, and health services
are all efforts by the State to improve the real human resources made
available to entrepreneurs. In Project Land Lease, the entire burden of
developing the resource was being transferred to the proposed entrepre-
neur.
One of the reasons for this was that the promoters of the project
never really conceptualized these resources as being at the disposal of the
State for any long-term period. This was so because the lease instrument
could not be expected to make the separation between ownership and
control. This would have required a more extensive law that would define
a new category of resource, call it SOCIAL PROPERTY4 if you will, and
place un-utilized land under this law before distributing it out to users.
What happened in Project Land Lease was that a significant amount
of credit had to be directed to farmers to improve the quality of the land
over which they had only a short-term right of use. In the first year of
operations the total expenditure of the project was J$507,491. Of this
4. Attention is drawn to the Social Property Laws promulgated by the Military Government
of Peru in 1970 as part of its policy of introducing cooperatives into that country's sugar cane
production.
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amount J$320,029 was extended in credit to farmers. Furthermore, 6076
of all credit (J$190,941) was for land clearing and ploughing.,
It is of interest to note that had the credit to the farmers been handled
by an independent source, the question of the land tenure would have
certainly arisen. However, this did not occur, because those who admin-
istered the credit were also those who were promoting the settlement of
farmers on the land. Because the farm analysis for credit would have
strained the administrative resources of the project, a system was devised
whereby the farmer signed an "Authorization" allowing the project to
debit his account for the inputs delivered. The practice that developed
was for the farmer to sign the authorization form first, and for the
amounts to be entered later on. While this system did function with a
minimum amount of paperwork and administrative personnel, most farm-
ers were found to have had no idea as to the extent of their indebtedness,
nor of a breakdown of the costs being incurred in the various activities.
It is obvious that the authorization document resolved the pending
administrative difficulties of extending credit. However, from the point
of view of their collective interests, the farmers clearly lacked the legal
resource skill to implement a better reporting of their debt position.
Therefore, information never entered effectively into their decisions con-
cerning production costs.
The credit system did not cater for one more important need of the
small farmer in any land settlement scheme. That is the need for a short-
term living allowance or what the Jamaicans called "carrying-on allow-
ance." In a subsequent survey of farmers in the project, 6 10% of them
attributed their failure to the fact that they had to seek alternative em-
ployment between the time of planting and harvest, in order to feed
themselves and their families. This in effect reduced their ability to tend
to their crops, affected their yields, and created confusion as to which was
their real income earning activity. In the first year of operations, sixty
farmers were caught in this contradictory position and were evicted for
lack of performance, while another seventy-nine had warnings pending.
Here is where we enter some new considerations, not found in other
enterprises. A producer/worker has cash needs based on his three essential
roles:
a. The entrepreneur/risk taker;
b. The producer/worker;
c. The householder/consumer.
5. See Government of Jamaica, Ministry of Agriculture, "An Evaluation of Project Land
Lease and Project Food Farm."
6. Id.
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As the controller of the productive asset, the worker or workers are expected
to devote an adequate amount of their time to the productive use of the
asset. As risk taker, their returns from this activity are neither guaranteed
in absolute terms nor in terms of regularity. But as consumers, their cash
needs are continuous. If no arrangements are possible for the individual to
fulfill his basic needs, he will either have to seek alternative employment
or divert some of the investment credit to consumption. Therefore, such
alternative production enterprises must transcend the narrow concept of
being organized institutions for the exchange of productive services and
also become effective institutions for distribution as well. One can easily
see how this consideration becomes more important when the economy is
attempting to recover from a natural disaster that has laid waste most of
the alternative employment options.
This is not only a question for credit but for the entire system of
distribution of enterprise income. Furthermore, it is not a question of
distinguishing between consumption and investment needs. Rather, it is one
of determining which needs will be financed on a long-term and which on
a short-term basis.
Project Land Lease therefore raised five issues that must be addressed
in the legal framework. The first is that qualitative as well as quantitative
distinctions be made with respect to the assets being transferred into
alternative use. The second is that the time period for the right of use of
the assets be consistent with the timespan of investments in the assets. The
third is that there is a social requirement that the State participate in the
improvement of the assets. The fourth is that credit be based on the
productivity of the enterprise's assets and that it address the full complement
of consumption and investment needs. The fifth is that enterprises should
also perform distribution services in addition to the exchange of resources.
LESSONS FROM THE SUGAR WORKERS COOPERATIVES
A second major issue in developing alternative production enterprises
is to be found in the economic arrangements necessary to maintain the
INTEGRITY of the enterprise. By integrity we mean the WHOLENESS
of the product unit, as defined by the set of complementary production
activities. There is a tendency on the part of planners and State decision-
makers to dismember traditionally integrated rural enterprises, e.g. estates
and factory production, and to reorganize these separate operations under
different enterprise structures.
Usually, the more labour intensive activities, where the economic returns
are very low, tend to become the prime targets for cooperatization by state
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planners. The more lucrative value-added sections would remain under the
corporate organization structure. Legal instruments are then used to bind
the two into marketing arrangements which sometimes place one or both
in a disadvantaged position. This was essentially the experience with the
Jamaica Sugar Cooperatives.
Sugar production in the Caribbean is an industrial process whose history
is as bitter as its output is sweet. In the early 1970s, the Jamaica Sugar
Companies, all foreign owned, faced a crucial crisis. The production of
sugar cane under the then existing structure was uneconomical, while the
production of sugar remained viable. Thus the factories were subsidizing
the production of their raw material. One option for the owners was to
mechanize the sugar cane production, i.e. particularly in terms of harvesting,
thus reducing the required work force and consequently the costs.
A solution that reduced the work force was not consistent with efforts
of the Government of Prime Minister Manley to increase employment. The
Government, therefore, decided to purchase the estate lands, and to organize
the production of cane along cooperative lines. In the first two years of
operation, the cane fields were therefore organized as cooperatives, while
the factories remained under the standard corporate structure.
Twenty-two cooperatives were created in 1975 on three of the largest
sugar cane estates. These estates were Frome, Monymusk, and Bernard
Lodge. Each cooperative was given 2000 acres of land which was considered
the economically viable size of operation. All workers on the estates at the
time of transition were incorporated into one or another of the cooperatives
so that no one suffered involuntary separation from his source of employ-
ment.
In addition to all this, each cooperative had to maintain the original
production relation with the factory. The lease agreement specified that the
cooperatives were required to maintain their lands in the production of
cane, and could only diversify insofar as the yields in the remaining acres
had improved to compensate for any loss in cane production. So we started
out with supposedly autonomous enterprises having certain decision-making
rights abridged by legal instruments. These rights included:
a. Rationalizing the use of all resources;
b. Rationalizing production decisions;
c. Rationalizing marketing decisions.
Let us examine some of these, starting with the use of its land resources.
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The factors to be considered in the production of cane were as follows:
a. The yield per acre (Tons Cane(TC)/Acres);
b. Transportation costs to the factory;
c. Cost of production of one ton of cane;
d. Price paid by the factory.
A team of sugar cane technologists had studied a subdivision of the
Monymusk lands, and had come up with some interesting guidelines. They
had suggested that the threshold point for viable cane production was a
yield of thirty tons per acre. They also noted that, given their projections
of expected cane prices over an eight-year period, only high yielding farms
which were within three miles of the factory would be operating profitably.
TABLE 2
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE OF THE COOPERATIVES
AT MONYMUSK (J$)
GREENWICH
1975/76 1976/77
BOG SPRINGFIELD
1975/76 1976/77 1975/76 1976/77
HILLSIDE
1975/76 1976/77
Cultivated 1,911 1,798 2,180 2,169 2,127 2,104 1,967 2,001
acres
Tons per 33.0 16.7 32.7 20 30.5 20.1 29.7 21.2
Acre
Cost per $27.76 $53.67 $23.67 $37.91 $24.01 $32.95 $26.12 $40.19
Ton
Price per $18.64 $16.25 $18.65 $16.25 $18.68 $16.30 $18.65 $16.45
Ton
Profit (loss) ($9.12) (37.42) (5.02) ($21.66) ($5.33) (16.65) ($7.47) ($23.74)
per Ton
EXETER MORELAND SALT SAVANNAH MUMBY
1975/76 1976/77 1975/76 1976/77 1975/76 1976/77 1975/76 1976/77
Cultivated
acres
Tons per
Acre
Cost per
Ton
Price per
Ton
Profit
per
1,888 2,040 1,977 1,658 1,659 1,558 1,797 1,702
29.2 22.1 26.7 19.9 23.2 11.5 22.4 12.6
$25.35 $31.48
$18.63 $16.25
N.A. 38.19 $31.29 58.82
18.54 16.25 $18.65 16.3
30.76 44.07
18.53 16.45
(loss) (6.72) ($15.23) $18.54 ($21.94) ($12.64) ($42.52) ($12.23) ($27.62)
Ton
Source: The Rescue and Development of the Sugar Cooperatives, Report of the Committee,
April 1978. Annex 3, Tables IV & V.
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Table 2 shows us the situation as it began to develop on the estate of
Monymusk. Between the two cropping seasons, 1975/76 and 1976/77, the
total cultivated acreage fell in all but two of the estates. More important
is the fall in yields realized (TC/A: Tons of Cane per Acre). Futher
aggravating the situation was the 10%0 to 12% fall in the price paid by
the factory over the same period.
It should be pointed out that the cooperatives took control of the
assets in January 1976. This means that the 1975/76 corp was essentially
planted under estate management, and only the harvesting was done under
cooperative management. The results for the 1975/76 season, therefore,
reflect more the efficiency of the former estate operations. Given the
suggested cut off point of thirty tons per acre, all but three cooperatives
should have been considering diversification options. By 1977, the per-
formance in all of the cooperatives failed to reach this benchmark.
The question is where was the adjustment to poor performance and
falling market prices to be instituted? The cooperatives essentially had
two routes. The first would have been through a programme of gradual
diversification out of sugar cane production, with a compensatory mech-
anism being in place if they were to continue to provide the volumes to
make the factory viable. The second would have been to adjust their costs
structure, which would have meant an adjustment in the labour costs
incurred in the production of cane.
There was no doubt that the cooperatives were operating at cost which
were as much as 55% higher than other cane farms in the area. Table 3
illustrates this.
TABLE 3
COMPARATIVE PER UNIT COSTS OF CANE PRODUCTION
1975/76 Crop, for Cooperative and Farms in the same region
BERNARD LODGE FROME MONYMUSK
Sugar Other Sugar Other Sugar Other
COSTS PER Coops. Farms Coops Farms Coops Farms
TON
Cultivation $12.07 $7.30 $9.78 $8.60 $9.43 $12.48
Harvesting $6.40 $4.42 $7.62 $5.60 $7.56 $6.48
Overheads $9.65 $6.32 $7.92 $6.49 $9.73 $5.13
Total $28.12 $18.04 $25.32 $20.69 $26.72 $24.09
Average Price $18.70 $18.70 $18.59 $18.59 $18.62 $18.62
Net Returns ($9.42) $.66 ($6.73) ($2.10) ($8.10) ($5.47)
Source: The Rescue and Development of the Sugar Cooperatives, Report of the Com-
mittee. Annex 4 "Cane Production on the Cooperatives" (April 1978).
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The production costs of the sugar cooperatives continued to be higher
than those of other farms for very many reasons. In the firt case the
cooperatives were grossly inefficient, a reflection of internal disorganiza-
tion and the absence of production planning. However, there were other
reasons directly related to decisions made at the factory level.
As was stated above, the legal arrangements had preempted any other
market options by the cooperatives. These arrangements were designed to
guarantee the viability of the factory operation, and this translated into
an obligation to supply the factory with cane for grinding. The overriding
importance of this obligation was based on two factors. First of all, the
factories were very old and had breakeven points above 70% of capacity
utilization. Secondly, these breakeven capacities translated into a land
requirement in cane in excess of 750%o of the land resources of the
cooperatives.
TABLE 4
BREAKEVEN POINTS IN FACTORY OPERATIONS
BERNARD LODGE FROME MONYMUSK
Capacity operation .7 .77 .81
for Breakeven
07o Coop Land required .84 .76 .92
in Cane for Factory
Source: Institutional and Economic Aspects of the Jamaican Sugar Cooperatives by
Vincent Richards & Allan N. Williams, in PARTICIPATION & SELF-MANAGED
FIRMS: EVALUATING ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE. (Derek Jones & Jan Svejnar eds.
1982).
The operation of delivering cane to the factories had another twist to
it. The independent cane farmers were unwilling to supply cane to the
factories during the weekends. Thus, in order to reduce downtime, the
factories enforced their agreement with the cooperatives, particularly with
respect to weekend supplies. To the cooperatives, this meant harvesting
during a premium wage-rate time period. The questions is why the
cooperatives were paying their own members premium wage rates to
deliver weekend cane when their financial situation could hardly afford
it. The answer to this question brings us to our second adjustment option,
which was to reduce costs by rationalizing the labour input.
Let us first understand what are the average labour requirements of
a 2,000 acre cane farm.
THIRD WORLD LEGAL STUDIES-1987
TABLE 5
NON-MANAGEMENT LABOUR REQUIREMENTS
FOR A 2,000 ACRE CANE FARM
REAPING: Cutters 105
Transport 4
Supervision 3
CULTIVATION: Spraying, Fetilizing 10
Irrigation 10
Tractor 4
Supervision 4
SERVICES: Mechanics 2
Service Helpers 3
Carpenter-Maintenace I
Compound Security 1
OFFICE: Accounting/Typist I
PEAK REQUIREMENT 148
MINIMUM REQUIREMENT 36
Source: "The Subdivision of Monymusk Lands: Agricultural Organizational and Ec-
onomic Considerations" prepared by team Reginald Burgess et al., under the
auspices of the Jamaica Association of Sugar Cane Techologists. [Private
Circulation (no date)].
A team under the auspices of the Jamaica Association of Sugar Cane
Technologists prepared the breakdown. This breakdown suggested that
the maximum labour requirement was 148 workers, with a minimum core
of 36 workers. As can be seen, the significant upsurge in labour needs
occur during the harvesting of the cane, i.e. cutters. Under the old estate
structure a major proportion of these were migratory workers.
When the cooperatives were formed, however, all persons working on
the estate were included. This meant membership levels ranging from 150
to 230 per cooperative; definitely too large for the prescribed pattern of
production, The cooperative law only provides for involutary separation
of members under very stringent conditions. What would have been
required was for the management of the cooperative to institute a rational
policy for the utilization of labour, shifting some of the excess workers
into alternative production activities. But, as we have said before, diver-
sification in the use of the land resources was very restricted.
Although the cooperative structure was imposed, the day to day
management of these enterprises still remained in the hands of the former
estate managment staff. These individuals were not entitled to join the
cooperatives, nor were they officially hired by the cooperatives. The
workers could not fire them. Thus it is not surprising to find that the
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workers continued to view the management structure as the same as
before. They, therefore, continued to pay their union dues and to demand
that the cooperative management pay wages and benefits commensurate
with those successfully negotiated on the remaining unionized sugar estates.
Thus weekend workers demanded overtime pay.
CONCLUSION
The experiences in the Sugar Cooperatives shows the disasters that
await us when expediency rather than rational and consistent arrangements
are used to recognize production enterprises. The tendency towards ex-
pediency is enhanced when workers are not permitted to be part of the
planning process, but are invited to participate only after the experts have
completed their plans. This approach has strong roots in the administrative
structures of the State. As such, it is essential that workers be supported
in the area of legal resources to ensure that the arrangements under which
they gain access to productive assets are consistent with their own devel-
opment goals.
REFERENCES
Government of Jamaica, Minister of Agriculture, Planning Unit, "An Evaluation of Project Land
Lease & Project Food Farms," July 1974.
Government of Jamaica, Ministry of Agriculture, Planning Unit, "Project Land Lease, Status Report
as of June 30, 1974," July 1974.
Goverment of Jamaica, Minister of Agiculture, The Report of the Committee set up by the Hon.
Minister of Agriculture, to make Proposals for the Rescue and Development of the Sugar
Cooperatives.
Jamaica Association of Sugar Cane Technologists, "The Subdivision of Monymusk Lands: Agricultural
Organizational and Economic Considerations." [Private Circulation (no Date)]
V. Richards & A. Williams, Institutional and Economic Aspects of the Jamaican Sugar Cooperatives,
in PARTICIPATION & SELF-MANAGEMENT FIRMS: EVALUATING ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE. (D. Jones
& J. Svejnar Eds. 1982).

